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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In its recent decision of Theobald v. University of Cincinnati, Ohio’s Tenth 
District Court of Appeals declared that medical practitioners shall have state 
employee immunity, based on section 9.86 of the Ohio Revised Code, anytime they 
treat a patient as long as they act in a dual role to “teach” an “involved” student or 
resident.1  This immunity takes away the patient’s right to sue the practitioner 
                                                                
∗J.D., 2006, University of Toledo College of Law; B.S., 2003, University of Detroit 
Mercy.  The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Susan Martyn of the 
University of Toledo College of Law for her assistance in preparing this article. 
1See Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 
857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006). 
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personally for his medical malpractice.  As required by this holding, the doctor must 
have an employment relationship with a state medical college.2  However, the 
employment relationship could encompass anything from a faculty position to 
something as minimal as a work relationship with a private practice plan closely tied 
to the state medical college.3 
Also, within this holding, the court held that the amount of involvement of the 
student or resident does not matter as long as the practitioner was “teaching” at the 
time of treatment.4  Essentially, teaching may be satisfied as long as the student or 
resident observes treatment.5  Finally, the court emphasized that the patient’s view of 
his relationship with the practitioner is completely irrelevant during an immunity 
determination.6  Thus, private patients will not be allowed to sue physicians in their 
private capacity. 
Theobald runs contrary to the established case law of Ohio at the time.7  The 
prior law was clear that practitioners receive immunity when treating a patient of the 
state or supervising another’s treatment of a patient.8  Moreover, when Theobald is 
compared to other jurisdictions’ immunity grants, Ohio appears to be an extreme 
outlier.9  And even when Ohio is compared to those states with nearly identical 
immunity statutes, Theobald still does not meet conventional jurisprudence.10 
Finally, not only is it difficult to justify the decision through precedent or 
conventional wisdom among the several states, but there are also harsh practical 
effects that make any policy justification unreasonable.  First, a plaintiff’s primary 
forum, in a Theobald-like case, has now been changed from the Court of Common 
Pleas to the Court of Claims.11  Second, with the grant of immunity, the state shall be 
liable for all damages, but statutory limitations allow much less recovery against the 
state than against private medical practitioners.12  These limitations result from the 
inflexibility of the cap on damages against the state, which does not provide for cap 
                                                                
2Id. at 372. 
3Id. at 372-74.  The nurse in this case was held to be an employee of the state since she 
worked with a practice plan that contributed funds to the college of nursing and the dean of the 
college had a certain extent of control over the funds. 
4Id. at 377. 
5Id.  One can infer that the court intends teaching to include practicing medicine with a 
student observing from its statement: “[s]tudents and residents then benefit from working with 
these clinical faculty members, learning to practice medicine by observing and assisting them 
in the treatment of patients.”  Id. at 375.  (emphasis added).  One may also draw this inference 
from the general tone of the opinion and the promotion of the University of Cincinnati’s 
interest in educating students. 
6Id. at 377. 
7See infra Part III. 
8See id. 
9See infra Part IV. 
10See id. 
11See infra Part V.A. 
12See infra Part V.B. 
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exceptions due to deformity, loss of limb, or loss of bodily organ system.  Third, 
Theobald gives state related practitioners less of an economic incentive to follow the 
standard of care than it does to private physicians, consequently devaluing medical 
service markets.13 
Part II of this article discusses how the case of Theobald developed and how the 
Tenth District came to its ultimate conclusion that dual agent medical practitioners 
should receive immunity.  Part III addresses Ohio’s prior case law leading up to the 
Theobald decision.  Part IV compares the Ohio immunity statute, section 9.86 of the 
Ohio Revised Code and the Theobald outcome to similar statutes and restatements of 
other states and their ultimate rules on dual agent immunity.  Part V discusses the 
practical effects of Theobald, including the change of forum, new limitation on 
damages, and economic effects on the medical service market. 
Theobald was upheld in law and fact by the Supreme Court of Ohio on December 
13, 2006.14  However, since the Tenth District Court of Appeals has issued all the 
pertinent case law on this matter, and the Supreme Court of Ohio simply affirmed the 
reasoning, this article shall discuss the Court of Appeals’ decision and not the 
Supreme Court’s. 
II.  THEOBALD V. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI 
A.  Theobald’s Facts 
Theobald began with a patient of the University of Cincinnati’s University 
Hospital alleging inadequate medical care, which resulted in blindness and lack of 
mobility in his arms.15  Mr. Theobald, a plaintiff and the victim in this case, arrived 
at the hospital in serious condition after a multi-car collision.16  Soon after arrival, 
the hospital staff identified his injuries and initially ascertained that surgery was 
necessary.17 
The practitioners, however, waited until the following day to perform more tests 
to ensure surgery was, in fact, required.18  Due to Mr. Theobald’s extensive spinal 
injury, surgery would be seriously complicated.19  The next day’s examinations and 
x-rays confirmed that he would need an operation, and that evening the medical team 
performed surgery.20  Three residents and a student assisted in or observed the 
treatment administered to Mr. Theobald at some point during the two days.21  The 
                                                                
13See infra Part V.C. 
14Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006). 
15Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 368-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 
857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006). 
16Id. at 368-69. 
17Id. at 368. 
18Id. 
19Id. 
20Id. 
21Id. at 377. 
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plaintiffs’ claim was that subsequent to the operation Mr. Theobald went blind and 
lost all mobility of his arms.22  
B.  Theobald’s Posture  
A year later, Mr. and Mrs. Theobald brought suit against the hospital and the four 
key medical practitioners that performed his operation.23  The group of four 
defendants included three doctors who worked for the University of Cincinnati 
[hereinafter UC] part-time and one nurse who volunteered as a part-time clinical 
instructor at the university.24  All four, however, also work professionally in private 
practice plans,25 which paid them individually for Mr. Theobald’s treatment.26 
Mr. and Mrs. Theobald filed suit in the Court of Claims against UC, a state 
actor.27  The four medical practitioners were also joined in the suit since they 
asserted immunity under section 9.86 of the Ohio Revised Code.  This section of the 
statute grants the employees and officers of the State of Ohio full immunity from 
civil liability when acting within the scope of their employment, unless the officer or 
employee acted with “malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless 
manner.”28  Therefore, before granting immunity a court must decide “(1) that the 
person is a state officer or employee, and (2) that the officer or employee was acting 
within his scope of employment and without malicious purpose, in bad faith or in a 
wanton or reckless manner.”29  Further, a court must assess whether the overriding 
interests of another severs the scope of employment for one who would otherwise be 
considered an employee of the state.30 
Procedurally, anytime there is a question of whether a person should receive state 
employee immunity under section 9.86, a plaintiff must proceed to the Court of 
Claims, which hears claims against the State, for an immunity determination.31  If the 
immunity is determined to be proper, the plaintiff’s only claim exists against the 
state, which waives sovereign immunity for actions of state employees who receive 
                                                                
22Id. at 368-69. 
23Id. at 369.  No claim was brought against the students or residents. 
24Id. at 372-73. 
25Private practice plans or groups are companies formed by medical practitioners who are 
contracted out to private patients rather than patients of the State. 
26Id. at 372-73. 
27Id. at 369.  The Court of Claims is the proper court in Ohio to bring a suit against the 
State. 
28OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (LexisNexis 2006). 
29Theobald, 827 N.E.2d at 372. 
30See Katko v. Balcerzak, 536 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) superseded on other 
grounds by Lautner v. Russell, No. 1-90-99, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4650 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Sept. 24, 1991); Balson v. Ohio State Univ., 677 N.E.2d 1216, 1222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
31OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(F) (LexisNexis 2006). 
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section 9.86 immunity.32  If immunity does not exist, then the cause of action will 
proceed to the Court of Common Pleas.33 
Accordingly, the Court of Claims held an immunity determination of whether the 
medical practitioners were employees of the state and acting in the scope of 
employment of UC.34  In its decision, the Court of Claims ruled that only two of the 
medical practitioners were employees of the state and none were within the scope of 
state employment.35 
After appeals on a separate issue, UC appealed the ruling of the Court of Claims 
as to state employee status.36  The Tenth District Court of Appeals heard the appeal 
and ultimately reversed the lower court’s decision.37  The Supreme Court of Ohio 
heard a final appeal by the Theobalds but ultimately affirmed the appellate court’s 
holding in both law and fact.38 
C.  Theobald’s Opinion and Holding 
The Tenth District first considered whether the doctors and nurse qualified as 
state employees.  Since the Court of Claims held that two of the doctors met the 
requirement for state employment, the Tenth District needed only to decide if the 
third doctor and the nurse were state employees.39  The court concluded that the 
doctor was a state employee since he had worked for the UC as an assistant 
professor.40 
The court focused much more on whether the nurse was a state employee, 
because the nurse’s employment relationship with UC was only as a volunteer 
clinical instructor.41  She received no compensation for her work from UC.  Instead, 
she was gainfully employed by a private practice plan which had a working 
relationship with UC.42  Particularly, the private practice plan provided funds for 
UC’s anesthesia department, and UC maintained checks on the practice plan’s 
budgetary concerns.43  The court ultimately decided that the relationship between the 
                                                                
32§ 2743.02(A)(1). 
33OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.01 (LexisNexis 2006).  Court of Common Pleas has 
general jurisdiction for all cases where there is no immunity.  Therefore, the Court of 
Common Pleas retains jurisdiction over actions against an individual and not the State. 
34Theobald, 827 N.E.2d at 369.  The suit against the medical professionals was filed in the 
Court of Common Pleas, but the Court of Claims joined them for determination. 
35Id. at 369-70. 
36Id. at 370. 
37Id. at 378. 
38Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006). 
39Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 369-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 
857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006). 
40Id. at 372-73. 
41Id. at 373. 
42Id. 
43Id. 
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private employer and UC was “sufficiently close,” in spite of being separate legal 
entities; thus, the nurse was considered a state employee for immunity purposes.44 
Next, the court discussed the case’s main issue: whether the medical practitioners 
acted within the scope of their employment during the surgery that led to the cause of 
action.  The court began by stating the general rule that "conduct is within the scope 
of employment if it is initiated, in part, to further or promote the master's business."45  
Thus, the court had to find enough state interest in the treatment of Mr. Theobald to 
find immunity.46 
The court analysis examined “scope of employment” by looking to the history of 
the doctrine.  It started with a traditional test that emphasized the “financial factor” 
of the scope of employment.47  This financial factor places the medical practitioner in 
the scope of employment of the party – practice plan or state entity – which collects 
money from the patient and pays the medical practitioner.48  If the court only applied 
financial factor testing in Theobald, all of the medical professionals involved would 
be outside the scope of state employment since the private practice plans collected 
fees from Mr. Theobald and paid them for the medical services rendered.49 
The court’s discussion then moved on to the education factor, which developed 
over the prior nine years as a counterpoint to the financial factor test.  The education 
factor maintains that a university, in this case UC, has an interest in students and 
residents assisting in and observing a patient’s treatment because such involvement 
creates a valuable learning experience that would not otherwise be available.50  
Additionally, the state has an interest in educational funding, which is partially 
provided by the private practice plans of medical practitioners.51  The court applied 
the education earlier in the decision of employee status for the nurse, where the 
funding of the medical school by the nurse’s practice plan and their intertwinement, 
created an effective employment between the nurse and UC.52   
After presenting these two opposing factors, the court then created new precedent 
by effectively removing the financial factor from any analysis of “within the scope of 
employment” for immunity purposes, leaving education as the only guiding factor.  
The court stated: 
[W]e conclude that although the financial factors may be relevant to 
determine whether a practitioner is an employee of the state, the financial 
factors generally have little bearing upon whether a practitioner is acting 
                                                                
44Id. 
45Id. at 374.  (citing Patena v. Univ. of Akron, No. 01AP-845, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1701, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2002)). 
46Id. 
47Id. 
48Id. 
49Id. 
50Id. at 375. 
51Id.  These practice plans are related to the medical college and give it a share of the 
proceeds from private medical procedures.  Id. 
52See supra Part II.C. 
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within the scope of his employment. . . .  Because the state's interest is 
promoted no matter how the education of the student or resident occurs, a 
practitioner is acting within the scope of his employment if he educates a 
student or resident by direct instruction, demonstration, supervision, or 
simple involvement of the student or resident in the patient's care.53  
Within this context, the court held a student’s or resident’s amount of involvement 
does not matter as long as the practitioner was teaching at the time of treatment.54  
Essentially, teaching may be satisfied as long as the student or resident observes 
treatment.55  Finally, the court stated that in an immunity determination, the patient’s 
view of his relationship with the practitioner is completely irrelevant.56 
Thus, the appellate court overruled the Court of Claim, set new precedent, and 
remanded the case for a determination of whether students or residents were 
involved in each aspect of Mr. Theobald’s treatment so each defendant’s immunity 
could be properly decided.57 
III.  HISTORY OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONER-STATE EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY CASE LAW 
It is important to look at the history of physician immunity since a major reason 
for the Theobald court’s holding was the continued progression to granting broader 
immunity for these physicians.  Also, it is important to keep in mind the question of 
whether Theobald follows the continued “progress” or sharply changes the direction 
of Ohio physician immunity law in terms of acting “within the scope” of 
employment.  Further, since the Tenth District is the appellate court to the Court of 
Claims, it is the only court that has proper authority to review decisions of immunity.  
And given that the Supreme Court of Ohio has yet to address the issue of physician-
state employee immunity in dual agency, the Tenth District has been the ultimate 
authority on the matter. 
The Tenth District cited Katko v. Balcerzak as the first case discussing the issue 
of medical practitioner-state employee immunity due to involvement with a State of 
Ohio-operated medical college.58  In Katko, a private patient’s estate brought a 
malpractice suit against a physician who treated the decedent at the Ohio State 
University Hospital.59  While the case did not specifically mention any teaching 
during the treatment of the patient, teaching was part of the doctor’s job description 
with the Ohio State University, and the court found the line between “when teaching 
stops and patient care picks up” to be blurry at best.60  The court remanded the case 
                                                                
53Theobald, 827 N.E.2d at 377 (emphasis added). 
54Id. 
55Id.   
56Id. at 378.  
57Id.  
58Katko v. Balcerzak, 536 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (Katko is the oldest case 
that the author found discussing medical practitioner-state employee immunity due to 
involvement with a State of Ohio-operated medical college.). 
59Id. at 11. 
60Id. at 14. 
76 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [VOL. 20:69 
for a factual determination as to whether the doctor in rendering services to a private 
patient was acting as an individual physician or as an employee of the university.61  
The court also discussed the fact that the Ohio State University did not receive any 
payment from the services provided by the defendant physician, but the court never 
expanded on the effect a receipt of funds by the university would have on the 
outcome of the case.62 
The next case on appeal to the Tenth District was Latham v. Ohio State 
University Hospital.63  In Latham, the court considered whether an emergency room 
attending physician could be considered an employee of the Ohio State University 
Hospital, for state liability purposes, when he is contracted for hospital work through 
a private corporation but also acts as an assistant clinical professor.64  The court 
omitted any mention of teaching or instructing residents or students during treatment 
of the decedent in the case.  Instead, the court primarily discussed the doctrine of 
respondeat superior and whether the hospital had the appropriate control to be held 
liable for the physician’s actions.65  After a brief review of the facts,66 including 
emergency room procedures set by the Ohio State University Hospital, the court held 
it could not “find in the record any evidence showing that the procedures used in the 
emergency room by the attending physician were set up by appellee so that appellee 
could control the mode and manner of the work involved.”67  Thus, the court held the 
hospital lacked sufficient control to find state employee status. 
Five years after Latham, the Tenth District heard York v. University of Cincinnati 
Medical Center.68  Again, in this case, a physician who worked as a professor for a 
state-operated medical school claimed to be immune from suit due to state employee 
status.69  And again, the court failed to mention any specific teaching with the 
treatment of plaintiff’s decedent.70  But unlike others before it, this defendant 
physician’s practice plan provided two percent of the fee for medical services to the 
                                                                
61Id.   
62Id. 
63Latham v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 594 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). 
64Id. at 1079. 
65Id.  
66The facts included the following:  
The attending physician at the emergency room (1) held the title of Assistant Clinical 
Professor in the Department of Emergency Medicine at the Ohio State University, (2) 
received payment from appellee for his services in the form of benefits such as 
football tickets and the use of appellee's facilities, and (3) used procedures in the 
emergency room that were set up by appellee. 
Id. 
67Id. 
68York v. Univ. of Cincinnati Med. Ctr., No. 95API09-1117, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1682 
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1996). 
69Id. at *1-2. 
70However, it was the purpose of the defendant physician’s practice group to “carry out 
and support the clinical practice and teaching functions of the Department.”  Id. at *4. 
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University of Cincinnati.  The court, however, still proceeded to a relationship of 
control, stating “an employment relationship will be found to exist only when one 
party exercises the right to control the actions of another, and those actions are 
directed toward an objective which the former seeks.”71  The court found that the 
physician was not performing any duty under the control of UC when he treated the 
plaintiff’s decedent; therefore, the duties performed fell outside the scope of 
employment, and the physician did not have state-employee immunity.72 
Months after York, the Tenth District heard Balson v. Ohio State University.73  
Balson contains enough facts to determine a compelling likeness to Theobald, more 
so than any other case to this point.  Like Theobald, the physician in the case treated 
a private patient, plaintiff’s decedent, with the assistance of a resident.74  Also, the 
physician held the position of assistant professor at the Ohio State University.75  
Additionally, the physician worked for a private practice group which was formed at 
the university’s behest and contributed a percentage of its earnings to the medical 
university.76  Unlike Theobald, however, based on the precedent of Katko and York, 
the court concluded that the physician treated the patient in his private capacity, 
“albeit ‘in connection with his employment’ at OSU.”77  Therefore, those actions 
were explicitly outside the physician’s scope of employment. 
The next case to come up on appeal, Norman v. Ohio State University Hospital,78 
has a special significance to this article since the Theobald court cited it as the case 
first setting out the “education factor.”79  Norman dealt with a physician, like in 
previous cases, working for a state university medical school and a private practice 
plan.80  Here, the physician’s duties under his university employment included 
remaining on call for the clinic provided by the university hospital to supervise 
residents.81  In this case, the plaintiff’s decedent was a patient who made reoccurring 
                                                                
71Id. (citing Hanson v. Kynast, 494 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 1986)).  Hanson factors for 
determining control include: (1) whether the individual is performing in the course of the 
principal's business rather than in some ancillary capacity; (2) whether the principal provided 
the materials and place of work; (3) whether the individual offers his services to the public at 
large or to one individual at a time; (4) the length of employment; (5) the right to terminate the 
employee at will; and (6) whether the individual was receiving compensation from the 
principal.  Hanson, 494 N.E.2d at 1095, 1095 n.5. 
72York, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1682, at *5. 
73Balson v. Ohio State Univ., 677 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
74Id. at 1217.  The court stated that the patient was billed for work performed by a 
resident.  Id. at 1219.  This is quite important since it is the first time the Tenth District 
discusses students or residents being involved with treatment in question for an immunity 
determination. 
75Id. at 1220. 
76Id. at 1218, 1220. 
77Id. at 1222. 
78Norman v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 686 N.E.2d 1146 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
79Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 375 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
80Norman, 686 N.E.2d at 1150-51. 
81Id. at 1150. 
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visits to the clinic but had only been treated by the defendant physician the time in 
question; thus, the court believed that the decedent was not a private patient but 
rather a patient of the university.82 
The court suggested that the lack of a private patient-doctor relationship 
distinguished Norman from prior case law, which led to the grant of state employee 
immunity to the defendant physician.83  Further, the fact that the university kept 70 
percent of the fees for the defendant’s services, the physican only received 30 
percent, and the physician’s private practice plan was entirely circumvented in the 
collection and distribution process all influenced the court.84  And contrary to 
Theobald’s representation, the court did not discuss any educational benefits the 
university received from the physician’s services. 
Chitwood v. University Medical Center adopted the rule from Norman.  In 
Chitwood, the defendant physician received immunity for treating a patient billed by 
the physician’s private practice plan since both parties had stipulated the defendant 
physician was within the scope of his employment with the university.85  The court 
stated soon after in Scarberry v. Ohio State University Hospitals that: 
[T]he university admitted in its answer and the parties had stipulated that 
the physician was acting within the scope of his employment with the 
university when he rendered care to the patient. The only legal conclusion 
that could be drawn from such stipulation was that the physician was 
entitled to immunity.86 
Thus, the stipulation by the parties was the only reason why the physician in 
Chitwood received immunity. 
After the appellate court decided Chitwood, the case of Kaiser v. Flege 
reaffirmed the Pre-Chitwood rule of Norman.  The two major determining factors to 
be used in finding whether a physician acted outside the scope of his or her 
employment for a state university hospital are:  “(1) whether the patient was a private 
patient of the physician, rather than a patient of the university; and (2) the 
                                                                
82Id. at 1151. 
83Id.  The Norman court stated “[o]ne of the determining factors in finding that the 
physicians in Katko, York, Balson and Harrison acted outside the scope of their employment 
was that the patients therein were private patients of the physicians, rather than patients of the 
universities.”  Id.  (emphasis added). 
84Id. 
85Chitwood v. Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 97API09-1235, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2106, at *6 
(Ohio Ct. App. May 5, 1998). 
86Scarberry v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., No. 98AP-143, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5649, at 
*14 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1998) (emphasis added).  In Scarberry, the court found that the 
defendant physician treated a patient, never said to have been a private patient, under his 
duties to train and supervise residents and only in connection with his services to the state 
university.  Id. at *17-19.  Additionally, the physician’s private practice billed the patient $151 
for his services while the Ohio State University hospital billed the patient $151,358.78.  See 
also Ferguson v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 98AP-863, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2828, at 
*9 (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 1999). 
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university's financial gain from the medical treatment at issue relative to the 
physician's financial gain therefrom.”87 
Kaiser is similar to previous cases.  In Kaiser, a doctor treated plaintiff’s 
decedent as a private patient and received payment through his private practice plan 
rather than the UC Medical Center, the university facility with which this defendant 
was affiliated.88  It was well agreed upon in this case that any teaching that may have 
occurred during the treatment, such as instruction of residents or students, was 
wholly “incidental” to the actual treatment.89  The court found that since plaintiff’s 
decedent was a private patient of the defendant and the university’s financial gain 
was minimal compared to that of the physician, the physician was not entitled to 
state employee immunity.90 
After Kaiser, the Tenth District heard a series of cases in which it expanded the 
scope of immunity for those physicians who merely supervised, within the scope of 
their employment with the state, the treatment of patients by residents.91  Because 
these cases mostly involve emergency room situations, they are distinguished from 
those cases determining whether a physician acts within the scope of employment.92 
The first of these cases, Ferguson, dealt with a physician who did not meet with 
the patient, but merely discussed the treatment with the treating resident.93  In the 
next case, Hopper, the court found that even though multiple physicians were present 
for each stage of decedent’s treatment, and a private practice plan billed decedent, 
residents treated the decedent; therefore, the physicians acted within the scope of 
employment with the state.94 
The court then heard Kaiser II in which a resident treated a patient under the 
supervision of an attending physician.95  The attending physician saw the patient for 
only four minutes.96  The court ruled that even though the physician made the final 
determination of admittance or release over the patient, his essential capacity was a 
supervisory role, conducted within the scope of his employment with the state.97  The 
last of these cases, Barkan, reiterated the rule of Kaiser II: 
                                                                
87Kaiser v. Flege, No. 98AP-146, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4458, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 
22, 1998).   
88Id. at *2, *6-9. 
89Id. at *8. 
90Id. at *9. 
91Ferguson, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2828; Hopper v. Univ.of Cincinnati, No. 99AP-787, 
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3456 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2000); Kaiser v. Ohio State Univ., No. 
02AP-316, 2002, Ohio App. LEXIS 5848 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2002); Barkan v. Ohio State 
Univ., No. 02AP-436, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 928 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2003). 
92Barkan, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 928, at *5-6. 
93Ferguson, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2828, at *5-6.  
94Hopper, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3456, at *1-4, *10. 
95Kaiser, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5848, at *10. 
96Id. 
97Id. at *3. 
80 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [VOL. 20:69 
Although these cases identify and discuss a variety of different factors 
relevant to an immunity determination, the key factor in this 
determination is whether the patient was essentially the doctor's private 
patient or whether the doctor treated the patient in his or her capacity as an 
attending physician supervising residents.98 
Barkan also involved an attending physician who briefly examined the patient 
after an initial examination by a resident.  The court again found that since the 
resident undertook the decedent as a patient, and the physician merely supervised the 
treatment, the physician had acted within his scope of employment with the state.99 
The key fact in all of these cases is that the residents treated the patients, the 
attending physicians did not.  Another significant factor is that most of the cases 
dealt with emergency room patients being treated immediately.100  The court held 
that an emergency room situation is a distinguishing factor in the immunity 
discussion since the patient is really a patient of the state rather than any specific 
doctor.101  In this case the patient is not referred to a specific physician, but ends up 
with an attending physician who is on call for the evening by chance.  Also, the 
admission of a patient to a hospital effectively forms an agency relationship between 
the doctor and hospital imputing liability to the hospital for the physician’s actions 
since the patient relies on the hospital for treatment.102  This concept could easily 
transfer to physician immunity in the emergency room context since an emergency 
room patient relies on the hospital for treatment rather than some specific physician. 
Finally, in 2001, during the middle of the previous series of cases, the case of 
Smith v. University of Cincinnati came before the court.103  In Smith, the court 
determined whether a physician who operated on a patient with a surgery resident 
present acted within the scope of employment with the state.104  In making its 
determination, the court did not consider any “education factor,” but it primarily 
considered the financial aspects of the case.105  It found that since the physician’s 
                                                                
98Barkan v. Ohio State Univ., No. 02AP-436, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 928, at *5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 6, 2003). 
99Id. at * 12. 
100Hopper v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 99AP-787, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3456 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Aug. 3, 2000). 
101Barkan, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 928, at *5-6. 
102The Supreme Court of Ohio stated: 
A hospital may be held liable under the doctrine of agency by estoppel for the 
negligence of independent medical practitioners practicing in the hospital when: (1) it 
holds itself out to the public as a provider of medical services; and (2) in the absence 
of notice or knowledge to the contrary, the patient looks to the hospital, as opposed to 
the individual practitioner, to provide competent medical care. 
Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, Syllabus of the Court (Ohio 
1994). 
103Smith v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 01AP-404, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5271 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Nov. 29, 2001). 
104Id. at *1. 
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private practice plan directed all payments he had acted outside the scope of his 
employment with the state in treating the patient.106 
When viewed in its entirety, the history of physician immunity, and more 
importantly, the determinative factors of acting “within the scope” of employment, 
takes a sharp turn in Theobald.  The Tenth District did not rely on any precedent that 
would objectively lead to the blanket holding in Theobald that any physician 
performing a teaching function while operating should be immune for the 
educational benefit provided to the state.  Instead, the precedent is clear that 
physicians are immune only when supervising and/or guiding a resident’s treatment 
of a patient or when a patient is a patient of the state hospital rather than the 
physician himself.  Therefore, Theobald created new law, rewriting section 9.86 
immunity to grant much broader immunity to practitioners involved with the 
education of students and residents and, thus, produced a judicial reform of medical 
malpractice. 
IV.  COMPARING THEOBALD TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Since the Theobald court based its holding on section 9.86 of the Ohio Revised 
Code, the state employee immunity statute, it is quite helpful to compare Ohio’s 
governing statute and governing law of other jurisdictions to show the similarity or 
differences in judicial application.  A survey was conducted of eighteen states, 
including Ohio, recording each state’s governing law and the subsequent applicable 
rule of immunity, formed through judicial interpretation, on whether physicians 
receive immunity when a student or resident is merely involved in the physician’s 
treatment of a private patient, such as in Theobald.107  This situation is distinguished 
from circumstances where a student or resident treats a patient under the supervision 
of the physician, or a patient is treated as a patient of a hospital rather than of the 
physician himself. 
The governing laws for state employee immunity are broken into three 
categories: Common Law, General Statutes on State Employee Immunity, and 
Specific Statutes on State Employee Immunity.108  Specific statutes are distinguished 
from general statutes by some specific requirement for state employee immunity 
such as an employee must perform discretionary governmental functions, an 
employee cannot personally profit from his or her actions, or, more applicable in this 
case, an employee doctor must not treat a patient at the time in question.109 
The rules formed through judicial interpretations and applications make up three 
categories: Outside Scope of State Employment, Case-By-Case Determination of 
Within/Outside Scope, and Within Scope of State Employment.  The “Case-By-
Case” rule allows for factual determinations of immunity, decided either by trial 
                                                           
105Id. at *16.  The court also considered that the procedure was performed in a private 
hospital, but it did not appear to have as much weight as the financial aspects.  Id. 
106Id. 
107The author has provided two charts to categorize the various forms of governing law 
and the practical rules of physician immunity.  See infra Part VIII. 
108See id.  “General statutes” and “specific statutes” are the author’s terminology used to 
describe the different kinds of statutes dealing with state employee immunity. 
109See supra text accompanying note 108. 
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courts as in Mississippi or juries as in Michigan.110  They differ from other states 
since these courts lay out legal factors for dual agency, which a trier of fact must use 
to determine whether state immunity applies to each separate set of facts.111  It is 
possible that the “Case-By-Case” states could have different fact finders coming to 
different conclusions on the same set of facts.  All other states have set rules of law 
leading to identical conclusions of immunity for identical sets of facts.112 
Of the surveyed states, five were governed by “Common Law” immunity, six 
were governed by “General Statutes,” and seven were governed by “Specific 
Statutes.”113  Under the section outlining applicable rules of immunity for dual 
agency for teaching while treating a private patient section, fifteen states are placed 
in the “Outside Scope” category, two states are placed in the “Case-By-Case” 
category and only Ohio is placed in the “Within Scope” category.114 
From the simple outlook of the chart, Ohio seems to be an extreme minority 
jurisdiction for applicable dual agency in the Theobald context.115  The question then 
follows whether the statutory expression, or the root common law, has an effect on 
the legal application.  Statutory comparisons must then be made to determine 
whether the Tenth District has a definite basis for such an outlying position. 
The states categorized as having “Specific Statutes” shall be omitted from any 
comparison since their statutes are inherently distinct from Ohio statute.  A 
comparison would reveal little about the quality of the Theobald decision since 
specific statutes leave little to judicial interpretation. 
A.  Comparing Ohio and Other “General Statute” States 
When looking deeper at the text of the general statutes, a group of states – Ohio, 
Mississippi, Florida, and Georgia – have similar language for immunity.116  For 
instance, these “conventional” general statutes have a pattern of consistency as 
demonstrated by Georgia’s statute: “[a] state officer or employee who commits a tort 
while acting within the scope of his or her official duties or employment is not 
subject to lawsuit or liability therefore.”117 
This kind of statute provides immunity generally to “officers” or “employees,” 
and leaves a more specific determination of whether or not a party qualifies as a state 
employee to the courts.118  Additionally, this kind of statute normally only requires 
that the employee act within the scope of his or her official duties.119  The courts 
                                                                
110See infra Part VIII. 
111Id. 
112Id. 
113Id. 
114Id. 
115Id. 
116Id. 
117GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-25(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
118Id. 
119Id. 
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again have the ability to spell out what constitutes “within the scope.”120  Ohio is the 
lone exception to this, expressly revoking immunity if an “officer or employee acted 
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”121 
Michigan, on the other hand, sets out a specific list of those with immunity: 
“officer and employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of 
a governmental agency, and each member of a board, council, commission, or 
statutorily created task.”122  Such a list relies much less on the courts to determine 
whether or not a party qualifies as a state employee.  The Michigan statute further 
sets out a list of qualifications to be met for immunity: 
(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably 
believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority. 
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a  
governmental function. 
(c) The officer's, employee's, member's, or volunteer's conduct does not 
amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or 
damage.123  
Those sections of Michigan’s statute further distinguish it from the 
“conventional” general statutes.  First, Michigan allows for immunity to apply in 
situations where the doctor has a reasonable belief of acting within the scope of 
authority.  No other general statute surveyed allows for a “reasonable belief,” so it is 
likely that the Michigan statute would apply in situations when no other state’s 
statute would.  This portion would also give reason for Michigan’s immunity 
determination by jury trial since there is a greater possibility of disputed facts under 
Michigan’s statute.  Second, Michigan’s statute requires that the state employee or 
officer be engaged in a “governmental function” during the tortious action.  And 
while governmental function is broadly defined,124 it may be an issue of limiting 
immunity that would not occur in the “conventional” general statutes. 
The third section of Michigan’s statute, requiring that an officer not be grossly 
negligent, is similar to Ohio’s limitation on immunity when an employee acts with a 
malicious purpose or in a wanton or reckless manner.  The Michigan statute even 
defines “gross negligence” as “so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of 
concern for whether an injury results.”125  Thus, recklessness is a common place 
element between the Ohio and Michigan statutes.  For current purposes, however, 
this similarity has little impact on Theobald-like analysis since gross negligence or 
                                                                
120Id. 
121OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (LexisNexis 2006). 
122MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(2) (2006). 
123Id. (emphasis added). 
124“Governmental function” is an activity that is expressly or impliedly mandated or 
authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law. Governmental 
function includes an activity, as directed or assigned by his or her public employer for the 
purpose of public safety, performed on public or private property by a sworn law enforcement 
officer within the scope of the law enforcement officer's authority.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
691.1401(f) (2006). 
125MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(7)(a) (2006). 
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recklessness was never alleged.  Therefore, the Michigan statute does not have as 
high a quality in a comparison to the Ohio statute as the “conventional” general 
statutes. 
Louisiana, conversely, does not fit into the group of “conventional” statutes, but 
its elements are similar.  It, like the “conventional” states, requires merely that any 
employee receiving immunity be “acting within the course and scope of their 
duties.”126  The difference between Louisiana and the “conventional” states is that 
Louisiana’s statute only addresses “state entities which may provide any kind of 
health care” and those employees who “provid[e] health care in connection with such 
state entity.”127  There is no general grant of immunity to all state employees.  
Despite this fact, the statute is similar enough to the “conventional” general statutes 
to compare the court’s application since it leaves to the courts to decide the scope of 
duty. 
Accordingly, out of the five statutes that are compared under the general statute 
section, Ohio allows for practitioner immunity when dually treating a patient and 
teaching a student.  Mississippi has no set law in such a scenario, but generally 
provides that trial courts use a set of five factors to determine whether or not 
immunity should attach.  Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana provide that a medical 
practitioner may not receive immunity since he or she has acted outside the scope of 
his or her employment. 
Georgia is quite clear that the relationship with the patient outweighs state duties; 
thus, no immunity can attach to any malpractice action.128  Florida holds that the 
most important factor is that of the relationship between the doctor and patient, and 
while immunity may be granted if the patient was not a private patient, the doctor-
patient relationship outweighs any dual agency with the state.129  Likewise, Louisiana 
allows for suit of a private patient in dual agency situations distinguishing the roles 
of duty owed to the state and those owed to the patient.130 
Mississippi and Ohio both stray from this common theme.  One explanation of 
this may be that the Mississippi statute states “it shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that any act or omission of an employee within the time and at the place of his 
employment is within the course and scope of his employment.”131  Likewise, Ohio’s 
statute may set a higher burden by stating an employee does not receive immunity if 
his actions “were manifestly outside the scope of his employment.”132  The language 
“manifestly” would require that the actions were “obviously” outside the scope of 
employment.  This may possibly act like the rebuttable presumption and put a higher 
burden on the party challenging immunity.133 
                                                                
126LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39(A)(1)(a)(i) (2006). 
127Id. 
128Keenan v. Plouffe, 482 S.E.2d 253, 257 (Ga. 1997). 
129See Martin v. Drylie, 560 So. 2d 1285, 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1990). 
130Landry v. Leonard J. Chabert Med. Ctr., 858 So. 2d 454, 464 (La. Ct. App. 2003). 
131MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-7(7) (2006) (emphasis added). 
132OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added). 
133See “Manifest,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/manifest (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
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However, both the “rebuttable presumption” and “manifest weight of evidence” 
deal with burdens of proof rather than the scope of employment themselves.  Thus, 
any argument that they would expand the scope to dual agency roles would probably 
fail.  Also, the Theobald court’s reasoning does not mention the specific weight 
given to the word “manifest” so it is assumed that it has little effect on the dual 
agency decision. 
Ultimately, it appears that there is no real distinguishing factor to “justify” why 
the Tenth District has taken a drastically different approach than the other general 
immunity statute states.  Such evidence supports the argument that Theobald was 
decided wrongly. 
B.  Comparing Ohio and Common Law States 
From the onset, it appears important to compare Ohio’s statute and law to those 
of the common law states.  The common law states may represent the ideas that the 
Ohio legislature tried to codify in section 9.86.  Also, the fact that all common law 
jurisdictions hold practitioners in dual agency are acting outside the scope of state 
employment could emphasize the divergent path the Tenth District has taken from 
the conventional grant of immunity. 
However, all of the common law restatements either require or emphasize 
“discretionary acts” of the state employee for receiving immunity, generally known 
as “governmental discretion.”  “Governmental discretion” is defined by situations 
when an actor must use his or her own judgment in the performance of his 
functions.134  It can best be defined by what it is not, which is called a “ministerial 
duty.”  “Ministerial duties” are those performed in a “prescribed manner, in 
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment or 
opinion concerning the propriety of the act to be performed.”135  Medical discretion, 
used during medical care, has been defined within “ministerial duties” by three of the 
common law states - Missouri, Alabama, and Texas.136  Thus, a medical 
practitioner’s failure to meet the standard of care falls outside “governmental 
discretion” so that immunity does not attach in these jurisdictions. 
Two other common law states, Virginia and North Carolina, do not touch on the 
issue of “governmental discretion” versus “ministerial duties.”  Instead, they both 
simply maintain that practitioners do not receive immunity for their actions with a 
patient.137  Virginia is especially animate that medical practitioners not receive 
immunity stating that a “failure to use such care in the treatment of patients is a 
violation of their duty to the patients and a departure from a condition of their 
employment.”138  Thus, if a practitioner breaches the standard of care, he also 
breaches his duty to the state, which falls outside the scope of employment. 
                                                                
134Collins v. N.C. Parole Comm’n, 473 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. 1996). 
135Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 42-3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
136Id.  See also Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 406 (Ala. 2000); Mussemann v. 
Villarreal, 178 S.W.3d 319, 320-23 (Tex. App. 2005). 
137See Urquhart v. Univ. Health Sys. of E. Carolina, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 143, 145 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2002); James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 864, 870 (Va. 1980). 
138James, 282 S.E.2d at 870. 
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All of the judicially expressed common law rules differ from section 9.86 of the 
Ohio Revised Code; therefore, it is inappropriate to compare them to the Tenth 
District’s interpretation. 
C.  Conclusion of State Comparisons 
The Theobald court’s reading of section 9.86 should only be compared to those 
states which have similar general immunity statutes.  All other states have far too 
different base rules to judge the quality of the Tenth District’s judicial interpretation.  
In the context of the similar general statutes, Ohio stands alone in holding that 
medical practitioners shall receive state employee immunity for dual agency 
situations involving the treatment of a private patient and education of a student or 
resident.  When Ohio is compared to all other jurisdictions, its outlier status is even 
more apparent, showing that the holding in Theobald is probably “unjustifiable.”  
Ohio has fallen behind both on the separation of principles in dual agency and the 
significant relationship between a medical practitioner and his patient.  This 
assessment is especially true, considering that Theobald actively changed the law 
and shattered well-settled Ohio precedent.139 
V.  POLICY ISSUES OF THEOBALD 
Because courts have been known for making decisions based on policy rather 
than law, and Theobald’s holding lacks strong legal support, it is appropriate to look 
at policy issues adverse to the benefits of the medical practitioners and medical 
schools.  Here, the greatest effects are the practical effects on plaintiffs bringing a 
suit similar to Theobald and the medical service markets as a whole. 
A.  Effect on Forum 
Before Theobald, a plaintiff who wished to sue her private physician for 
malpractice merely filed suit in the local Court of Common Pleas.  However, due to 
this decision and section 9.86 immunity, the Court of Common Pleas is no longer the 
proper venue.  Once the defendant has asserted immunity, the plaintiff must now 
bring the suit to the Court of Claims as it has sole jurisdiction over claims against the 
state and claims against state employees.140  Additionally, the Court of Claims has 
sole jurisdiction to determine whether an “employee” of the State has § 9.86 
immunity.141  Thus, Theobald requires all cases in which a medical professional 
                                                                
139See supra Part III.  
140OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(F) (LexisNexis 2006). 
141Conley v. Shearer, 595 N.E.2d 862, 866-67 (Ohio 1992) (holding that jurisdiction to 
determine immunity of a state employee has been taken away from the common pleas court; 
Court of Claims now has exclusive jurisdiction to determine this).  See also Johns v. Univ. of 
Cincinnati Med. Assoc., 804 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio 2004) (explaining that the Court of Claims 
is the only court that may determine immunity for employees; plaintiffs must file in the court 
within a timely manner under sections 2743.02 and 2743.16); Clark v. Alberini, No. 2001-T-
0015, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5665 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2001) (holding that no matter 
what the Court of Claims must always first decide the issue of immunity before a suit may 
proceed in the Court of Common Pleas).  See generally White v. Bragg, No. 2001-T-0015, 04-
CA-50, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 516 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2005); Cullen v. Ohio Dep't of 
Rehab. & Corr., 709 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the Court of Claims has 
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treats a patient with observations made by a student or resident to proceed to an 
immunity determination in the Court of Claims. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs should bring all suits to the Court of Claims, even when a 
defendant has yet to assert state employee immunity, since waiver is extremely 
difficult to achieve.142  And while a defendant may contend that she was not a state 
employee at the time of treatment, such a claim may have little bearing on the 
outcome of an immunity determination.143  Plaintiffs’ best course of action is staying 
their proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas until the Court of Claims has made 
the proper immunity determination.144 
Therefore, Theobald burdens malpractice plaintiffs in their suits against negligent 
practitioners by forcing them to bring their cases to two separate fora.  Furthermore, 
there is confusion surrounding the procedure that plaintiffs must follow.  This leaves 
outstanding claims susceptible to a dismissal based on semantics rather than reaching 
the substantive issues of the case.  
                                                           
sole jurisdiction to determine whether doctors are immune from suit as employees of the State 
of Ohio). 
142An affirmative defense may be raised only by (1) expressly using that defense as part of 
a pre-pleading Civ. R. 12(B) motion to dismiss, (2) expressly setting forth that defense in a 
responsive pleading pursuant to Civ. R. 8(C), or (3) by amending one's responsive pleading 
pursuant to Civ. R. 15 so as to include that defense. . . . A failure to utilize any of these three 
methods for raising an affirmative defense will result in a waiver thereof.  (emphasis added).  
Spence v. Liberty Twp. Tr., 672 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added).  
However, direction further provides that “[l]eave of court shall be freely given when justice so 
requires.”  OHIO R. CIV. P. 15(A) (2006).  This grants such broad leeway for amendments that 
courts have allowed amended responsive pleadings even after a case has begun its trial phase.  
Leibson v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 618 N.E.2d 232, 238 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1992).  Therefore, waiver may not take effect until a judgment has been entered.  
Additionally, if the parties expressly or impliedly consent to go forward as if an affirmative 
defense had been asserted, then no pleading whatsoever shall be required by the court.  OHIO 
R. CIV. P. 15(B) (2006).  Finally, Ohio appellate districts are split on whether or not a general 
pre-pleading 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim preserves the right to assert 
immunity after judgment has been entered, even when the 12(b)(6) motion is not explicit on its 
face that immunity exists.  Spence, 672 N.E.2d at 217-18.  The Fourth district has stated a 
general 12(B)(6) will not preserve an immunity defense, whereas the Twelfth and Eighth 
districts have allowed the preservation.  Id.  Therefore, even after judgment, waiver may still 
be asserted.  Id. 
143Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (stating 
“[n]either Nurse Parrott's admission that she was not an UC employee nor her testimony that 
she was not compensated by UC is dispositive of her employment status”), aff’d, 857 N.E.2d 
573 (Ohio 2006). 
144Authority for granting a stay found in Walker v. Steinbacher, 523 N.E.2d 352, Syllabus 
of the Court (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).  The Syllabus states in its entirety: “[w]hen state 
employees are sued in their official and individual capacities in the court of common pleas, the 
court should stay proceedings until the Court of Claims determines whether the defendants' 
conduct was outside the scope of their employment because it was malicious, in bad faith, 
wanton or reckless. The court of common pleas may not grant an ‘interlocutory order of 
dismissal’ pending the Court of Claims' determination of the applicability of the statutory 
immunity provided by R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(A)(1); the better practice is for the court to stay 
proceedings upon such terms as are appropriate.”  Id. 
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B.  Effect on Damages Recoverable 
Most disturbing about Theobald is its limitation of damage awards for plaintiffs 
who suffer harm due to medical malpractice.  While the state itself is liable when 
immunity is granted, there are greater limitations on damages recoverable in suits 
against the state than medical practitioners in their private capacity.  One may 
speculate whether the decision was politically motivated to both reduce the total 
recovery of plaintiffs and to ease the burden of malpractice insurance for private 
doctors.145 
In any case, the controlling cap on damages has changed from section 2323.43 of 
the Ohio Revised Code, limiting medical malpractice awards, to section 3345.40, 
limiting awards against the state.146  While both caps (1) allow full recovery on 
economic damages, (2) generally act to limit non-economic damages to $250,000, 
and (3) do not apply to suits brought for wrongful death under chapter 2125 of the 
Ohio Revised Code, there still exists a profound disparity in granting exceptions.147  
Specifically, section 3345.40 provides for a $250,000 cap on claims against the State 
of Ohio for non-economic or “non-actual loss” with no exceptions.  Such “non-actual 
losses” include: “fees paid or owed to an attorney . . . pain and suffering, for the loss 
of society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection, advice, 
guidance, counsel, instruction, training, or education of an injured person, for mental 
anguish, or for any other intangible loss.”148 
Likewise, section 2323.43 explicitly includes in its non-economic recovery list 
most of the losses from the “non-actual loss” list in section 3345.137.149  However, 
section 2323.43 allows for recovery of non-economic damages greater than $250,000 
in certain situations.  First, a plaintiff may recover non-economic damages up to 
three times the amount of economic damages, not exceeding $350,000 for a plaintiff 
or $500,000 for each occurrence.150  In this way, the $250,000 cap acts to limit large 
scale non-economic damage awards where actual loss is low since any awards 
exceeding $83,333 in economic damages will be exempted from the $ 250,000 cap. 
                                                                
145The political push for medical malpractice reform has been well documented; most 
notably the push comes from President Bush who has proposed a cap of $250,000 for non-
economic damages.  CNN.com, Bush Outlines Medical Liability Reform, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/16/bush.malpractice/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2007); Jeffrey Birnbaum 
& John Harris, President's Proposed Remedy to Curb Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Stalls, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2005, at A05, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
articles/A21931-2005Apr2.html; GOP.com - Republican National Committee, Legal Reform, 
http://www.gop.com/Issues/Legal Reform/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
146OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (LexisNexis 2006) (listing the generally applicable 
cap on damages for economic and non-economic damages in medical claim).  Section 3345.40 
limits the damages for claims against the State.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.40 (LexisNexis 
2006).  Since doctors receive immunity, all malpractice claims covered by Theobald must be 
brought against the State of Ohio.  § 2323.43(G)(1). 
147OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3345.40(B)(3), 2323.43(A)(2)-(3), (G)(3) (LexisNexis 2006). 
148See id.  § 3345.40(A)(2)(b). 
149OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43(H)(3) (LexisNexis 2006). 
150See id. § 2323.43(A)(2). 
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Section 2323.43 also grants a second exception where a plaintiff may recover up 
to $500,000 of non-economic loss or $1 million for all plaintiffs in an occurrence if 
the plaintiff suffers either: “(a) [p]ermanent and substantial physical deformity, loss 
of use of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ system; [or] (b) [p]ermanent physical 
functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to 
independently care for [him]self and perform life sustaining activities.”151  Thus, 
section 2323.43 takes into account the severity of the outcome from malpractice and 
attempts to “make the plaintiff whole” through monetary means.  section 3345.40 
makes no such exception. 
In Theobald, if Mr. and Mrs. Theobald had been able to sue together under 
section 2323.43, the general malpractice statute, they would have been able to 
receive up to $1,000,000 in non-economic damages due to Mr. Theobald’s 
permanent loss of the use of his arms and eyes.152  The Tenth District’s decision, 
however, took away their right to recover that amount by placing them under the 
$250,000 inflexible cap of section 3345.40.  By removing upwards of $750,000 of 
compensation for severe loss caused by medical malpractice, this ruling 
demonstrates the real impact on real people.  Therefore, the Theobald ruling 
unfortunately deprives malpractice victims of a significant amount of recovery to be 
“made whole” through monetary compensation. 
C.  Economic Effects on Medical Services Market 
Besides the more practical effects of Theobald, this case may also have 
burdensome consequences on the medical services market.  If so, this would 
demonstrate that further policy considerations oppose the court’s holding, much like 
the practical considerations.  Foremost, this opinion removes all economic incentive 
that would otherwise provoke greater care on the part of private medical practitioners 
and, thus, better care for patients.  Additionally, it creates a heavy burden on the 
State to compensate loss for the negligence of these doctors. 
First, when courts hold doctors and other medical practitioners liable for medical 
malpractice, a practitioner’s insurer will usually cover the cost of litigation and 
judgment against the doctor.  The insurer’s cost subsequently relies on the 
negligence of the insured because more suits will lead to greater cost to defend the 
insured and more judgments against practitioners, which are paid by the insurer.  The 
insurer in turn passes that cost on to the insured practitioners, charging greater 
insurance premiums for higher risk insureds. 
The Theobald ruling directly reduces costs for insurers of practitioners who 
qualify for immunity because a large portion of claims against their insureds will 
now be immune from suit.  This could lead to insurers cutting insurance rates for 
private practitioners that will receive immunity.  For instance, if an insurer takes a 
survey and determines that one doctor will have a student with him for half of his 
patients, his liability insurance premiums could be reduced by half since he is half as 
likely to be liable. 
Further, if an insurer, when determining insurance premiums, does not take 
account for claims against the State due to a particular doctor’s negligence while 
                                                                
151See id. § 2323.43(A)(3). 
152See id. § 2323.43(A)(3); Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 368-69 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006). 
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immune, there will be no economic disincentive for malpractice of the immune 
doctor.  That specific doctor could be negligent in dealing with fifty percent of his 
patients and, as long as students or residents are present for treatment, he will suffer 
no adverse consequences financially.  Removal of the disincentive could then lead to 
increased negligence because doctors have less reason to follow the standard of care, 
consequently leading to worse services provided to consumers.  Particularly, these 
physicians may attempt riskier treatment of a patient when following the standard of 
care would work just as well. 
And while some may argue that the doctors’ fear of consumer response in 
demand markets will create the necessary economic disincentive to balance off the 
elimination of liability disincentive, a free market economist will point out that the 
medical services market has artificial restrictions, thus, restricting supply and 
limiting competition.153  Since the American Medical Association, through political 
influence, has been successful in efforts to control the amount of new doctors 
entering the practice of medicine, competition suffers and market incentive 
arguments fail because there is a fixed supply of doctors with a limited amount of 
time to treat patients.154  Even if a free market would allow consumers to completely 
reject a particular physician’s services, the necessity of treatment and scarcity of 
supply would make a broad-based rejection of physicians affected by Theobald 
impractical. 
Also, many consumers of medical services are not sophisticated in researching 
doctors to know their history of malpractice.155  And even if a consumer is 
sophisticated, most “lay” people see medical malpractice plaintiffs as guilty of 
bringing a frivolous claim until proven otherwise.156  This point of view prevents 
                                                                
153“[T]he American Medical Association and other industry groups have predicted a glut 
of doctors and worked to limit the number of new physicians. In 1994, the Journal of the 
American Medical Association predicted a surplus of 165,000 doctors by 2000.”  Dennis 
Cauchon, Medical Miscalculation Creates Doctor Shortage, USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 2005, at 
1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-03-02-doctor-shortage_x.htm.  
The number of doctors is a political decision, heavily influenced by doctors themselves.  Id. 
154Dale Steinreich, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 100 Years of Medical Robbery, June 10, 
2004, available at http:// www.mises.org/story/1547  (citing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM 
AND FREEDOM 152 (University of Chicago 1982) (1962)). 
155Andrea Stephenson, Medical Information on the Internet, http://www.floridahealthstat. 
com/publications/fhcj/stephenson.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) (discussing the fact that 
elderly need medical information the most, but have the least sophistication to get that 
information on the internet, where most information is posted).  See also Lorraine S. Wallace, 
The Impact of Limited Literacy on Health Promotion in the Elderly, 2 CALIFORNIAN J. HEALTH 
PROMOTION 1 (2004), http://www.csuchico.edu/cjhp/2/3/01-04-wallace.pdf (last visited Oct. 
10, 2006) (discussing limited literacy of elderly consumers). 
156“According to Dr. Ellen Leggett of the Leggett Jury Research, their database reflects 
that one-third of jurors nationally believe that the people who file medical malpractice cases 
are looking for easy money; two-thirds believe that plaintiff lawyers pressured patients into 
filing malpractice suits; many believe that malpractice cases are driving up their medical 
insurance rates, and half of the jurors believe that malpractice cases are ruining the health care 
system in this country.”  Howard L. Nations, Overcoming Jury Bias, 11 MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: LAW & STRATEGY 1 (1992), available at http://www.howardnations.com/ 
overcomingjurybias/OJB.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
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most perspective patients from considering malpractice suits when choosing a 
doctor, thereby, making “market correction” improbable.  Furthermore, many 
patients choose their physicians, or other medical service providers, through referrals 
or assignment in times of urgency.  In these situations, the patient relies on the 
referral.  Such reliance makes it less likely that the average consumer of medical 
services would conduct an investigation of the new practitioner’s background and 
end the relationship. 
Lastly, with Ohio’s overwhelming budget deficit, estimated to be in the $1 billion 
range for 2006, the court disregarded the burden these malpractice actions place on 
society.157  The extra cost for the state will deprive budgetary funding from other 
areas that society may deem worthier than a negligent physician, such as education, 
public transportation, preventative medical treatment, relief money for economically 
deprived areas.  Therefore, this ruling negatively affects consumer markets and 
general society.  The court should have considered these factors in making its 
decision. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Tenth District’s opinion in Theobald seems to have little support, either in 
the trends of the State of Ohio or in conventional interpretation of a statute similar to 
Ohio’s section 9.86.  Further, while such legal “justification” may be unnecessary if 
a policy interest so commands, there exists strong policy interests opposing the 
expanding role of state employee immunity in medical malpractice suits.  Plaintiffs 
not only must deal with procedural complications, but also lose out on the chance to 
recover up to $750 million more than if the suit was against a medical practitioner in 
his private capacity.  Additionally, the patients of the State of Ohio may receive a 
lesser quality of health care due to the removal of the economic disincentive.  Any 
reduction in the standard of care that may occur is too much when patients’ lives are 
at stake.  Finally, the already burdened state budget will now have to bear an added 
weight; consequently, harming some other state program, which helps people who 
are not wealthy medical practitioners.  In light of these implications, review and 
reversal of Theobald is proper. 
VII.  EPILOGUE 
On December 13, 2006, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued an opinion on the 
Theobalds’ appeal from the Tenth District.158  The Court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, granting immunity to medical practitioners, based on section 9.86 of the 
Ohio Revised Code, anytime they treat a patient as long as they act in a dual role to 
“teach” an “involved” student or resident.159 
In its analysis, the court only discussed the issue of whether the “individual 
[medical practitioners] act[ed] within the scope of employment when the cause of 
action arose.”160  Like the appellate court, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed past 
                                                                
157Pamela M. Prah, Billion-Dollar Deficits Greet Several Statehouses, Stateline.org, 
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=15
928 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
158Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006). 
159Id. 
160Id. at 577. 
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cases on medical practitioner dual agency, noting that the old “financial factor” test 
had been eroded since the advent of the “educational factor” in Norman.161  It then 
agreed with the Tenth District’s implementation of the “educational factor” test as 
the only test for whether a practitioner had acted in the scope of employment since 
“the question of scope of employment must turn on what the practitioner’s duties are 
as a state employee and whether the practitioner was engaged in those duties at the 
time of an injury.”162  It then concluded that a medical practitioner employed by the 
state to teach, who is teaching a student or resident at the time of malpractice, shall 
receive state employee immunity. 
The dissent argued that due to the great burden this rule places on plaintiffs, 
requiring simultaneous suits in the Court of Claims and Common Pleas, the appellate 
court should have been overturned and immunity not granted.  The dissent then 
challenged the claim that a practitioner is in fact teaching when a student is merely 
present in the room: 
[D]octors are busy professionals, often called upon to make irreversible 
decisions of the utmost magnitude with little time for reflection, and they 
make mistakes. When they do, whether they are immune from liability 
should not depend solely on whether a student is present.  Teaching by 
osmosis is not the same as talking a resident through an operation.  The 
mere presence of a student does not establish that instruction is taking 
place.163 
The dissent then moved onto policy issues of cost-shifting and the lack of a jury 
trial. For cost-shifting, it argued that it would likely saddle the state with many 
judgments, yet not reduce insurance premiums because insurance companies “cannot 
know in advance whether any future negligence will occur in the presence of a 
student.”164  It then argued that the constitutional right to a jury trial was disturbed by 
this decision, forcing more cases to the Court of Claims, where there is no jury 
trial.165 
                                                                
161Id. at 579. 
162Id. at 580. 
163Id. at 581-82. 
164Id. at 582. 
165Id. at 583. 
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VIII. APPENDIX: PHYSICIAN IMMUNITY CHARTS166 
A.  Governing Law of Immunity 
   
Governing Law of Immunity 
Common Law Statutory – 
General 
Statutory - 
Specific 
Alabama 
Restatement grants immunity to 
“agent” when: 
(1) formulating policy; 
(2) exercising judgment in the 
administration of a government 
agency; 
(3) discharging duties imposed 
on an agency and prescribed by 
statute; 
(4) enforcing criminal laws; or 
(5) discharging statutory duties 
relating to releasing prisoners, 
counseling persons of unsound 
mind, or educating students.167 
Ohio 
“Except for civil actions that 
arise out of the operation of a 
motor vehicle and civil actions 
in which the state is the 
plaintiff, no officer or employee 
shall be liable in any civil action 
that arises under the law of this 
state for damage or injury 
caused in the performance of 
his duties, unless the officer's or 
employee's actions were 
manifestly outside the scope of 
his employment or official 
responsibilities, or unless the 
officer or employee acted with 
malicious purpose, in bad faith, 
or in a wanton or reckless 
manner.”168 
 
“‘Officer or employee’ means 
[]: A person who, at the time a 
cause of action against the 
person arises, is serving in an 
elected or appointed office or 
position with the state or is 
employed by the state.”169 
Colorado 
“‘Public employee’ 
includes [] [a]ny health 
care practitioner employed 
part-time by and holding a 
clinical faculty 
appointment at a public 
entity as to any injury 
caused by a health care 
practitioner-in-training 
under such health care 
practitioner's supervision. 
Any such person shall 
maintain the status of a 
public employee when 
such person engages in 
supervisory and 
educational activities over 
a health care practitioner-
in-training at a nonpublic 
entity if said activities are 
within the course and 
scope of such person's 
responsibilities as an 
employee of a public 
entity.”170 
 
                                                                
166See supra text accompanying note 108. 
167Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 913 (Ala. 2000). 
168OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (LexisNexis 2006). 
169OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.36(A)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2006).  The statute specifically 
names doctors as de jure employees in certain instances, but does not do so in this case.  Id. 
170COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-103(4)(b)(II) (2006). 
94 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [VOL. 20:69 
 
Texas 
“Ordinarily, public officials 
must show the following 
elements to establish a defense 
of official immunity: 
(1) the performance of a 
discretionary function, 
(2) in good faith, and 
(3) within the scope of the 
employee's authority.”171 
Mississippi 
“An employee may be joined in 
an action against a 
governmental entity in a 
representative capacity if the act 
or omission complained of is 
one for which the governmental 
entity may be liable, but no 
employee shall be held 
personally liable for acts or 
omissions occurring within the 
course and scope of the 
employee's duties.”172 
 
“[I]t shall be a rebuttable 
presumption that any act or 
omission of an employee within 
the time and at the place of his 
employment is within the 
course and scope of his 
employment.”173 
 
“‘Employee’ means any officer, 
employee or servant of the State 
of Mississippi or a political 
subdivision of the state, 
including elected or appointed 
officials and persons acting on 
behalf of the state or a political 
subdivision in any official 
capacity, temporarily or 
permanently, in the service of 
the state or a political 
subdivision whether with or 
without compensation.”174 
 
New Jersey 
“[A] public employee is 
liable for injury caused by 
this act or omission to the 
same extent as a private 
person.”175 
 
“Except for an 
examination or diagnosis 
for the purpose of 
treatment, neither a public 
entity nor a public 
employee is liable for 
injury caused by the 
failure to make a physical 
or mental examination, or 
to make an adequate 
physical or mental 
examination, of any person 
for the purpose of 
determining whether such 
person has a disease or 
physical or mental 
condition that would 
constitute a hazard to the 
health or safety of himself 
or others. For the purposes 
of this section, ‘public 
employee’ includes a 
private physician while 
actually performing 
professional services for a 
public entity as a volunteer 
without compensation.”176 
                                                                
171Mussemann v. Villarreal, 178 S.W.3d 319, 323 (Tex. App. 2005) (citing Kassen v. 
Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1994)). 
172MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-7(2) (2006). 
173§ 11-46-7(7). 
174MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-1(f) (2006).  Like Ohio, this statute specifically names 
doctors as de jure employees in certain instances, but does not do so in this case.  Id. 
175N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-1(a) (West 2006). 
176N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:6-4 (West 2006). 
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Missouri 
“The Missouri rule is in line 
with the general run of authority 
that a public officer charged 
with discretionary duties is not 
liable for a mistake of judgment 
or an erroneous performance of 
said duties unless he be guilty 
of willful wrong in relation 
thereto, but that as to ministerial 
duties he is liable for the 
violation or neglect thereof to 
the party injured thereby and 
that a mistake of judgment does 
not excuse him.”177 
 
Florida 
“No officer, employee, or agent 
of the state or of any of its 
subdivisions shall be held 
personally liable in tort or 
named as a party defendant in 
any action for any injury or 
damage suffered as a result of 
any act, event, or omission of 
action in the scope of her or his 
employment or function.”178 
Oklahoma 
“Physician faculty 
members and staff of the 
University of Oklahoma 
Health Sciences Center 
and the College of 
Osteopathic Medicine of 
Oklahoma State University 
not acting in an 
administrative capacity or 
engaged in teaching duties 
are not employees or 
agents of the state.”179 
North Carolina 
“As long as a public officer 
lawfully exercises the judgment 
and discretion with which he is 
invested by virtue of his office, 
keeps within the scope of his 
official authority, and acts 
without malice or corruption, he 
is protected from liability.”180 
 
Georgia 
“A state officer or employee 
who commits a tort while acting 
within the scope of his or her 
official duties or employment is 
not subject to lawsuit or liability 
therefore.”181 
Illinois 
“The state statutorily 
grants immunity on a 
limited basis, it has been 
argued that the following 
section should apply to 
doctors: 
“[A] public employee 
serving in a position 
involving the 
determination of policy or 
the exercise of discretion 
is not liable for an injury 
resulting from his act or 
omission in determining 
policy when acting in the 
exercise of such discretion 
even though abuse.”182 
                                                                
177Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 42-43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).  Ministerial Functions 
are defined as “of a clerical nature which a public officer is required to perform upon a given 
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without 
regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the act to be performed.”  
Id. at 43. 
178FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(a) (2006). 
179OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152(5)(b) (2006). 
180Collins v. N.C. Parole Comm’n, 473 S.E. 2d 1, 7-8 (N.C. 1996) (quoting Smith v. State, 
222 S.E. 2d 412, 430 (N.C. 1976)). 
181GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-25(a) (2006). 
182745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-2001 (2006). 
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Virginia 
In determining whether a state-
employed physician is entitled 
to the protection of sovereign 
immunity, a court must apply a 
four-factor test consisting of: 
“(1) the nature of the function 
performed by the employee, 
(2) the extent of the state's 
interest and involvement in that 
function, 
(3) the degree of control 
exercised by the state over the 
employee, and 
(4) whether the alleged 
negligent act involved the use of 
judgment and discretion.”183 
Michigan 
“[E]ach officer and employee of 
a governmental agency, each 
volunteer acting on behalf of a 
governmental agency, and each 
member of a board, council, 
commission, or statutorily 
created task force of a 
governmental agency is 
immune from tort liability for 
an injury to a person or damage 
to property caused by the 
officer, employee, or member 
while in the course of 
employment or service or 
caused by the volunteer while 
acting on behalf of a 
governmental agency if all of 
the following are met: 
   (a) The officer, employee, 
member, or volunteer is acting 
or reasonably believes he or she 
is acting within the scope of his 
or her authority. 
   (b) The governmental agency 
is engaged in the exercise or 
discharge of a governmental 
function. 
   (c) The officer's, employee's, 
member's, or volunteer's 
conduct does not amount to 
gross negligence that is the 
proximate cause of the injury or 
damage.”184 
 
“This act does not grant 
immunity to a governmental 
agency or an employee or agent 
of a governmental agency with 
respect to providing medical 
care or treatment to a patient, 
except medical care or 
treatment provided to a patient 
in a hospital owned or operated 
by the department of 
community health.”185 
Wisconsin 
“No suit may be brought 
against any volunteer fire 
company organized under 
ch. 213, political 
corporation, governmental 
subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional 
torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or 
employees nor may any 
suit be brought against 
such corporation, 
subdivision or agency or 
volunteer fire company or 
against its officers, 
officials, agents or 
employees for acts done in 
the exercise of legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial 
or quasi-judicial 
functions.”186 
                                                                
183McCloskey v. Kane, 604 S.E.2d 59, 61 (Va. 2004) (citing James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 
864, 869 (Va. 1980)).  Generally, Virginia’s statutes provide for specific times for immunity; 
when outside of the statute, a common law approach applies.  Id. 
184MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(2) (2006). 
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 Louisiana 
“‘State health care provider’ or 
‘person covered by this Part’ 
means: The state or any of its . . 
. universities, facilities, 
hospitals, clinics, [] health care 
units, ambulances, [] university 
health centers, and other state 
entities which may provide any 
kind of health care whatsoever, 
and the officers, officials, and 
employees thereof when acting 
within the course and scope of 
their duties in providing health 
care in connection with such 
state entity.187 
 
“[T]he state shall pay any 
damages, interest, cost of 
investigation and defense, and 
any other costs in connection 
with any claim lodged against 
any state health care provider 
for an alleged act of medical 
malpractice. . . .  The coverage 
provided herein shall apply only 
when the state health care 
provider is acting within the 
terms of the definition of ‘state 
health care provider. . . .’”188 
 
Minnesota 
“Any claim based upon the 
performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or 
duty, whether or not the 
discretion is abused.”189 
 
 
  Tennessee 
“State officers and 
employees are absolutely 
immune from liability for 
acts or omissions within 
the scope of the officer's or 
employee's office or 
employment, except for 
willful, malicious, or 
criminal acts or omissions 
or for acts or omissions 
done for personal gain.”190 
 
 
 
                                                           
185§ 691.1407(4). 
186WIS. STAT. § 893.80(4) (2006). 
187LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39(A)(1)(a)(i) (2006). 
188§ 40:1299.39(g). 
189MINN. STAT. § 466.03 Subd. 6 (2006). 
190TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(h) (2006). 
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B.  Applicable Rule of Immunity When Teaching Through Treatment and Dual 
Agency with Private Organization 
  
Outside Scope Case-By-Case Within Scope 
Florida 
In one case similar to Theobald, 
the court overruled a granting of 
summary judgment based on 
physician immunity since there 
was a factual dispute as to his 
function at the time of the 
surgery, including whether or 
not any physicians-in-training 
assisted in the procedure.191  
Further, the court stated that the 
critical issue in determining 
immunity is that of the 
relationship between the doctor 
and patient, in reference to the  
supervision of another doctor or 
direct treatment of the patient.192  
Immunity is probably not 
available here under the  
circumstances in Theobald. 
 
Mississippi  
Five factors are offered to 
determine immunity: 
1. the nature and function 
performed by the employee; 
2. the extent of the state's 
interest and involvement in the 
function; 
3. the degree of control and 
direction exercised by the state 
over the employee; 
4. whether the act complained 
of involved the use of 
judgment and discretion; and 
5. whether the physician 
receives compensation, either 
directly or indirectly, from the 
patient for professional 
services rendered.193 
Immunity is determined by the 
trial court.  Courts have held 
the state has an interest in 
having a ready pool of 
candidates, so in most cases, a 
doctor is probably immune.194  
However, these cases do not 
discuss dual agency where the 
medical practitioner receives 
payment from a private patient. 
 
Ohio  
Theobald's Rule: “[A] 
practitioner is acting within 
the scope of his 
employment if he educates 
a student or resident by 
direct instruction, 
demonstration, 
supervision, or simple 
involvement of the student 
or resident in the patient's 
care.”195  Also, the 
relationship between the 
patient and doctor does not 
matter at all; this includes 
the private patients of the 
doctor.196 
                                                                
191Martin v. Drylie, 560 So. 2d 1285, 1288-1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
192Id. at 1289. 
193Mozingo v. Scharf, 828 So. 2d 1246, 1250 (Miss. 2002) (citing Miller v. Meeks, 762 
So. 2d 302 (Miss. 2000)). 
194Sullivan v. Washington, 768 So. 2d 881, 882 (Miss. 2000). 
195Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
196Id. 
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Georgia  
The physician's duty to the 
patient is independent from his 
official state duties and he is still 
under a duty to treat the patient 
with a reasonable degree of care 
and skill,197 even to the extent 
where a patient signs a form 
acknowledging that the 
procedure will take place at a 
teaching hospital and that 
students and observers will be 
present for educational 
purposes.198 
 
Michigan 
Jury determination is necessary 
on whether the agency with the 
state is dissolved through 
service to a private master.199  
Michigan maintains that an 
employee could be deemed to 
be acting for two masters 
simultaneously.200 
 
Virginia 
“[I]mplicit in the employment by 
the University of Virginia of 
physicians to teach in its 
Medical School and to attend 
patients in its Hospital, is the 
understanding that they will use 
reasonable care in the 
performance of their duties. A 
failure to use such care in the 
treatment of patients is a 
violation of their duty to the 
patients and a departure from a 
condition of their 
employment.”201 
 
   
Alabama  
The Supreme Court of Alabama 
has stated that employees such 
as doctors who use "medical 
discretion" do not receive 
immunity.202  Also, supervising 
doctors have been held liable for 
their acts and omissions in 
supervising residents.203 
 
  
                                                                
197Keenan v. Plouffe, 482 S.E.2d 253, 257 (Ga. 1997). 
198Id. 
199Vargo v. Sauer, 576 N.W.2d 656, 666 (Mich. 1998). 
200Id. at 665. 
201James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 864, 870 (Va. 1980). 
202Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 406 (Ala. 2000) (holding that doctors treating 
students at a state university health center are not entitled to immunity).  
203Hauseman v. Univ. of Ala. Health Serv. Found., 793 So. 2d 730, 736 (Ala. 2000). 
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Texas 
Doctors using medical discretion 
to treat patients are not entitled 
to immunity.204  Additionally, 
“supervising the medical 
decision-making of less-
experienced doctors, along with 
determining when to consult 
more-experienced physicians, 
are the exercise of medical 
discretion.”205 
 
   
Tennessee  
A physician would receive 
immunity if he does not act in a 
private capacity, and students or 
residents participate in the 
treatment.  However, if the 
doctor privately bills a patient, 
there is no immunity.206 
   
Oklahoma  
Whenever treating a patient, a 
faculty physician is acting 
outside the scope of his or her 
employment with the state.207 
 
    
Louisiana 
Courts have held doctors may be 
held personally liable in 
negligent supervision of a 
medical intern in treating 
patients; thus, there is no 
immunity.208  The court 
separated the negligence of the 
intern being supervised and the 
negligence of the doctor in 
supervision.  Also, statute 
requiring the state to bear the 
cost of defending a “public 
employee” will not prevent the 
public employee from being 
sued in his private capacity, nor 
be accounted for there within.209 
 
  
                                                                
204Mussemann v. Villarreal, 178 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tex. App. 2005). 
205Id. 
206Hayden v. Waller, No. 02A01-9511-BC-00241, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 867, at *21 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). 
207Nelson v. Pollay, 916 P.2d 1369, 1376 (Okla. 1996). 
208Landry v. Leonard J. Chabert Med. Ctr., 858 So. 2d 454, 464 (La. Ct. App. 2003). 
209 Id. at 461. 
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Colorado  
Following the statute, whenever 
a doctor supervises a resident-in-
training, he is immune.210  The 
statute also discusses educating 
along with supervising, and no 
cases explore this further.  This 
could very well mean mere 
involvement, however, probably 
not since it says “supervising 
and educating;” so, supervising 
would be required.  Also, this 
will most likely only apply for 
supervising residents since the 
statute explicitly names 
“residents-in-training.” 
 
  
Missouri  
A doctor acts in a ministerial 
function when treating a patient; 
thus, he never gets immunity.211  
By not exercising the sovereign's 
power in treating patients, a 
doctor acts the same as if he was 
in private practice.212 
    
Wisconsin  
Medical discretion does not get 
immunity; it is considered 
“ministerial.”213  Only when the 
conduct involves the 
determination of fundamental 
governmental policy and is 
essential to the realization of that 
policy is where the immunity is 
applied. 
    
Illinois 
Every doctor owes his patient 
the duty of ordinary care; 
immunity will only be granted 
for acts such as administrative or 
legislative duties.214 
    
                                                                
210 Sereff v. Steedle, No. 03CA1445, 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 1291, **8-10 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
211 Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
212 Cooper v. Bowers, 706 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
213Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 370 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); Protic v. 
Castle Co., 392 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), superseded by statute, WIS. STAT. § 
893.82 (2006), as recognized in Daily v. Univ. of Wis., 429 N.W.2d 83 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); 
Walker v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp., 542 N.W.2d 207, 212-213 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
214Jinkins v. Lee, 807 N.E.2d 411, 413 (Ill. 2004). 
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North Carolina 
A doctor sued for malpractice 
does not receive immunity, 
regardless of his employment 
with the state.215 
    
New Jersey  
Courts have held that the statute 
“immunizes only the public-
health activities of physicians 
and expressly approves of 
liability for treatment of 
patients;” thus, doctors do not 
receive immunity for treatment 
of patients at anytime.216 
 
    
Minnesota  
Medical practitioners employed 
by the state are not entitled to 
official immunity.217 
    
 
                                                                
215Urquhart v. Univ. Health Sys. of E. Carolina, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 143, 145 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2002).  This is further evidenced by the case of Jones v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 410 
S.E.2d 513 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).  In the case, a suit was brought against the East Carolina 
University School of Medical, eight doctors who were faculty members at the medical school 
and on staff at the hospital, and seven residents-in-training.  Id. at 514.  The medical school 
was the lone defendant to be dismissed on grounds of immunity.  Id. at 513-14.  This shows 
that faculty members probably were not able to receive immunity in dual agency and possibly 
even that residents-in-training do not receive immunity. 
216 Willis v. Ashby, 801 A.2d 442, 444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
217 Terwilliger v. Hennepin County, 561 N.W.2d 909, 913-14 (Minn. 1997). 
